The Employment of strategic ambiguity in .U.S policy toward the Iranian nuclear program since 2015

Abstract

The study revolves around the strategic ambiguity in US policy towards the Iranian nuclear program after 2015. The study seeks to reveal the process of employing this strategy by successive US presidencies since 2015, in addition to attempting to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the results, and to know its impact on the crisis, as well as its compatibility with the declared goals or true intentions that each administration tried to achieve through this strategy. The most prominent results reached by the study are that the ambiguity strategy worked to succeed the US traditional deterrence policy, and made it not forced to use direct military tools except in limited cases. This is because the ambiguity in US foreign policy contributed to making Iran reevaluate its positions and behavior as a result of pressure and the growing state of uncertainty in its foreign and domestic decisions. The results of this strategy on the Iranian nuclear program crisis varied as a result of the succession of US presidencies during that period. During the term of President Obama, the United States succeeded in employing a strategy consistent with the declared goals of formulating and approving an international agreement, but President Trump attempted to employ this strategy towards other alternatives after withdrawing from The previous agreement failed because it attempted to use this strategy to achieve goals other than those announced, namely reducing Iran's regional influence and missile capabilities, which Iran rejects and considers non-negotiable red lines. Under President Biden, despite his efforts to reach a new agreement with Iran, his attempt was unsuccessful due to the restrictions imposed by the previous administration, which made returning to the previous agreement without making new amendments to it a defeat for the United States.